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RISKY BUSINESS: THE CREDIT CRISIS AND
FAILURE (PART III)
Olufunmilayo B. Arewa*

I. CONSUMERS, INDUSTRY, AND REGULATORY COSTS
Collection and effective analysis of financial market data may help
prevent future crises. The high human costs of market crises, which may
significantly affect those least well positioned to bear such costs,1 make
prevention of future crises a high priority. This is particularly true in light
of the pervasive financial market networks that characterize contemporary
financial markets. Further, through their influence on financial variables
such as interest rates and currency prices, financial market networks reach
deep into the homes and pocketbooks of a significant portion of the world‘s
population.2 The fallout from the subprime mortgage market collapse thus
illustrates fundamental ways in which financial market participants and the
broader global community are linked.
A. Costs of Ineffective Regulation
Individuals and businesses bear costs in connection with regulatory and
industry failures that lead to market crisis. First, although federal financial
regulators ―are largely self-supporting through fee collections, assessments,
or other funding sources,‖3 individuals in their roles as consumers, taxpayers, workers, and investors pay the costs for ineffective yet costly U.S.
regulatory frameworks,4 including significant levels of business financing
of regulation.5 Second, although the costs of U.S. bailouts are projected to
*
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EDWARD LIPUMA & BENJAMIN LEE, FINANCIAL DERIVATIVES AND THE GLOBALIZATION OF RISK
3–5 (2004).
2
Id.
3
U.S. GOV‘T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-02-864, SEC OPERATIONS: IMPLICATIONS OF
ALTERNATIVE FUNDING STRUCTURES 9 (2002), http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d02864.pdf (link).
4
Thomas D. Hopkins, Regulatory Costs in Profile, 31 POLICY SCI. 301, 310 (1998).
5
Id.; see also U.S. GOV‘T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-02-302, SEC OPERATIONS: INCREASED
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be significantly less than the estimated $700 billion authorized under the
Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP),6 taxpayers bear much of the cost of
financial industry bailouts.7 Third, taxpayers may suffer significant deleterious consequences from the impact of the credit crisis on the real economy,
which is suggested by a broad range of economic data, such as unemployment and mortgage foreclosure statistics, personal bankruptcies, and more
restricted access to credit.8 Although the costs for financial market players
have been high, financial institutions‘ losses have been subsidized by the
U.S. government, and ultimately borne to some extent by U.S. taxpayers.9
Losses and costs from the credit crisis, including credit losses, U.S. stock
market losses, lost production and costs associated with declining gross
domestic product, have likely reached the trillions.10
Given the enormous costs imposed by the credit crisis, regulatory
reform efforts need strengthening, and reformers must fundamentally rethink the U.S. regulatory architecture. If the credit crisis does not lead to a
fundamental redesign of U.S. financial market regulation, it is not clear
what level of financial market catastrophe would be required to do so. With
the exception of the Treasury Blueprint optimal regulatory structure, none
of the existing reform proposals come close to fundamental redesign, which
is troubling given the profound costs imposed by the credit crisis and ineffective yet costly U.S. regulatory frameworks. Further, ineffective regulation is doubly costly, because it may lull market participants, including
investors, consumers, and professional market actors into thinking that the
government is actually monitoring risk.

WORKLOAD CREATES CHALLENGES 29–30 (2002), http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d02302.pdf (noting
that although federal bank regulation is self-funded, SEC collections are deposited with the U.S. Treasury in an account that provides for SEC appropriations and other uses and that SEC collections significantly exceed the amount of SEC appropriations) (link). In 2003, SEC collections were projected to be
$1.3 billion, while the President‘s appropriation request for the SEC was $467 million. Id.
6
CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE, REPORT ON THE TROUBLED ASSET RELIEF PROGRAM 2 n.6
(2010), available at http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/112xx/doc11227/03-17-TARP.pdf (noting that the authority for the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP) was originally set at a maximum of $700 billion
but was later reduced by about $1.3 billion) (link).
7
Id. at 1 (estimating that TARP will cost taxpayers $109 billion and noting that Office of Management and Budget cost estimates total $127 billion).
8
See COMM. ON CAPITAL MKTS. REGULATION, THE GLOBAL FINANCIAL CRISIS: A PLAN FOR
REGULATORY REFORM 723 (2009), available at http://www.capmktsreg.org/pdfs/TGFCCCMR_Report_(5-26-09).pdf (detailing the impacts of the financial crisis and noting that some aspects
are difficult to quantify) (link).
9
Meredith Whitney, The Credit Crunch Continues, WSJ.COM, Oct. 1, 2009,
http://online.WSJ.com/article/SB10001424052748704471504574445470989162030.html (noting that
―taxpayer dollars have supported ‗too big to fail‘ businesses‖) (link).
10
COMM. ON CAPITAL MKTS. REGULATION, supra note 8, at 1011.
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B. Financial Literacy and Risk Penalties: Creating Incentives for Better
Risk Management and Disclosure
In the absence of fundamental regulatory redesign, other useful actions
might help better align internal industry and regulatory incentives, such as
intensifying penalties for behaviors that create systemic risk, creating
broader mechanisms for financial literacy and education about risk at all levels of activity, and developing better risk disclosure practices for market
participants.
1. Meaningful Penalties: Sliding Scale Incentive Regulation
In addition to ensuring that private market discipline rests on incentives that encourage market participants to properly price risk, regulatory
penalties should be reconsidered in light of existing incentives. Auction
Rate Securities (ARS) markets illustrate the impact of incentives for financial market participants. ARS, which were first issued in 1984, are ―longterm, variable-rate instruments that have their interest rates reset at periodic
and frequent auctions.‖11 The ARS market, which collapsed in February
2008, seemingly offered benefits to both issuers and investors.12 ARS
enabled issuers to vary their credit spread over time by issuing long-term
variable-rate debt without establishing either a fixed interest rate or a variable benchmark and credit spread for the life of the instrument at the time of
issuance, as would be the case with traditional fixed-rate or variable-rate instruments.13 ARS were the subject of a 2006 SEC settlement in which firms
settled for $13 million, without admitting or denying SEC charges.14 This
settlement is negligible when compared to the amount of money that banks
made from underwriting and managing ARS auctions. Given the revenue
flows from the $330 billion that the ARS market reached before its collapse,15 and banks‘ earnings of 1% for underwriting fees and twenty-five

11

STEPHANIE LEE, NERA ECONOMIC CONSULTING, AUCTION-RATE SECURITIES: BIDDER‘S
REMORSE? 1 (2008), http://www.nera.com/image/PUB_Auction_Rate_Securities_0708.pdf (describing
ARS securities) (link).
12
Id.
13
Id. at 4. A typical fixed rate debt instrument would have the fixed interest rate for the life of the
instrument determined at the time of issuance and would not change with interest rate fluctuations.
RICHARD A. BREALEY, STEWART C. MYERS & FRANKLIN ALLEN, PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE FINANCE
398 (9th ed. 2008). In contrast, a variable rate debt instrument would generally have the method of interest rate calculation determined based on a variable benchmark interest rate and credit spread at the
time of issuance (e.g., LIBOR (London Interbank Offered Rate) + 1%). Id. As a result, even though the
effective interest rate would vary over the life of the variable interest rate debt instrument, the method of
calculation and the credit spread above the benchmark rate of interest would be established at the time of
issuance.
14
Press Release, SEC, Fifteen Broker-Dealer Firms Settle SEC Charges Involving Violative Practices in the Auction Rate Securities Market (May 31, 2006), http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2006/200683.htm (link); Order Instituting Administrative Cease-and-Desist Proceedings, Securities Act Release
No. 8,684 (May 31, 2006), http://www.sec.gov/litigation/admin/2006/33-8684.pdf (link).
15
LEE, supra note 11, at 2.
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basis points for each auction,16 it is likely that banks gained far in excess of
the $13 million SEC settlement. For example, if the $330 billion in sales
occurred in a single year, with auctions of all outstanding ARS taking place
monthly, bank revenues from ARS underwriting fees in that year alone
could exceed $3 billion.17
Given the monetary incentives that existed in the ARS market, the
2006 settlement likely constituted a minor slap on the wrist. The ARS settlement occurred during a time of declining penalty collections by the
SEC.18 In contrast, sliding scale penalties might provide a better mechanism for aligning incentives in some instances. Sliding scale regulation has
been applied in the context of regulated industries such as telecommunications.19 In the financial market context, sliding scale penalties could be
conceptualized as forced profit or revenue-sharing, with payments into a
fund established by regulators for certain first or continuing regulatory violations. Assuming that the amount of the profit or revenue-sharing could
be set at an appropriate level, the prospect of such profit or revenue penalties would likely facilitate internal firm risk management and shareholder
monitoring to avoid the penalties. In the ARS case, even a penalty of as
low as 10% of profits accrued for using the practices that led to the SEC
charges, or some percentage of firm profits during the periods in which violations occurred, might have had a greater impact on future behavior.
Recognition of the importance of meaningful penalties was a factor in
Judge Rakoff‘s 2009 rejection of an SEC settlement with Bank of America
in relation to its acquisition of Merrill Lynch, which reflects judicial concern about the nature, fairness, and amount of SEC settlements.20 Judge
Rakoff described the proposed settlement as ―neither fair, nor reasonable,
nor adequate‖ and noted that the $33 million settlement was ―a trivial penal-

16

See LEE, supra note 11, at 12 (noting that the underwriter typically receives a fee of 25 basis
points); Administrative Complaint at 37-38, In the Matter of UBS Securities, Inc., No. 2008-0045
(Mass. Sec. Div. June 26, 2008), available at http://www.sec.state.ma.us/sct/sctubs2/ubs2_complaint.pdf
(stating that UBS‘ underwriting fee is typically 1%) (link).
17
For example, 1% of $330 billion would garner $3.3 billion in annual underwriting fees.
18
U.S. GOV‘T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-09-358, SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION:
GREATER ATTENTION NEEDED TO ENHANCE COMMUNICATION AND UTILIZATION OF RESOURCES IN THE
DIVISION
OF
ENFORCEMENT
68
(2009),
http://www.securitiesdocket.com/wpcontent/uploads/2009/05/gaoreportsec.pdf (noting declining levels of SEC penalties in the period preceding the credit crisis, with penalties becoming more like disgorgement) (link).
19
Donald J. Kridel, David E.M. Sappington & Dennis L. Weisman, The Effects of Incentive Regulation in the Telecommunications Industry: A Survey, 9 J. REG. ECON. 269, 290–293 (1996) (finding increasing productivity under incentive regulation schemes in the telecommunications industry); see
generally Michael A. Crew & Paul R. Kleindorfer, Incentive Regulation in the United Kingdom and the
United States: Some Lessons, 9 J. REG. ECON. 211, 221 (1996) (noting that different structures of incentive regulation can yield different outcomes); Thomas P. Lyon, A Model of Sliding-Scale Regulation, 9
J. REG. ECON. 227, 228 (1996) (giving an efficiency rationale for sliding scale regulation).
20
SEC v. Bank of America Corp., 653 F. Supp. 2d 507, 509, 512 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (mem. order).
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ty for a false statement that materially infected a multi-billion dollar merger.‖21
2. Risk Education and Financial Literacy
The credit crisis also demonstrates a significant need for better financial education with respect to risk, both for sophisticated market participants and regulators who need a more comprehensive understanding of
complex financial products, trading strategies, and networks. Financial
market regulation that is based on an assumption of private market discipline implicitly assumes that market participants have sufficient knowledge
and education to enable them to effectuate the discipline that is part of the
foundation on which market regulation rests. Although education can be a
blunt tool, a pervasive lack of knowledge by multiple parties was no doubt
a factor in the crisis. For example, the ARS market was developed by broker-dealers who were willfully ignorant about the products they sold. Interviews by Massachusetts officials of ARS financial advisors revealed
knowledge based only on conversations with other advisors and mere anecdotal understanding of the products they were selling, much of which was
incorrect.22 In many instances, ARS customers, including sophisticated
purchasers such as Pulitzer Prize-winning financial writer James Stewart,
lacked knowledge about the risks of what they were buying.23
In addition to better professional education for market participants and
regulators, greater consideration should be given to ways to make retail investor education more comprehensive and interactive. A televised public
service announcement series that focuses on investment and financial market basics might assist retail investors in understanding financial market
products and investment best practices. Further, current methods for determining retail investor qualifications may also be inadequate. In addition
to the financial thresholds that exist for individual investors under Regulation D,24 greater consideration should be given to having standardized in21

Id. at 512.
Administrative Complaint at 2529, In the Matter of UBS Securities, Inc., No. 2008-0045 (Mass.
Sec. Div. June 26, 2008), available at http://www.sec.state.ma.us/sct/sctubs2/ubs2_complaint.pdf (noting lack of training and understanding about ARS by UBS financial advisors that sold ARS) (link).
23
See James B. Stewart, Risks of a ‘Safe’ Investment Are Found Out the Hard Way, WSJ.COM, Feb.
27, 2008, http://online.WSJ.com/article/SB120406650371394765.html (link).
24
Regulation
D,
17
C.F.R.
§ 230.501(a)
(2010),
available
at
http://edocket.access.gpo.gov/cfr_2009/aprqtr/pdf/17cfr230.501.pdf (defining an accredited individual
investor to include banks and savings institutions as well as persons with an individual or joint net worth
in excess of $1 million or person with an individual income in excess of $200,000 or joint income in
excess of $300,000 in the two most recent years with a reasonable expectation of the same level of income in the current year) (link). The Restoring American Financial Stability Act of 2010 Senate bill
would significantly change the operation of Regulation D and permit the SEC to disqualify certain Regulation D offerings. See Restoring American Financial Stability Act of 2010, S. 3217, 111th Cong.
§ 926
(2010),
available
at
http://banking.senate.gov/public/_files/ChairmansMark31510AYO10306_xmlFinancialReformLegislati
onBill.pdf (link).
22
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vestor tests as a key aspect of private market discipline. True assessment of
investor qualifications should go beyond the check-the-box approach of
some investor qualification questionnaires. For example, this could involve
developing interactive investor knowledge tests (IKTs), which could be
geared to the specific nature of varied investment opportunities. The purpose of such tests would not be to require a particular score from a prospective investor alone or together with the investor‘s representative, but to help
ensure that potential investors and financial service providers are forced to
focus on the types of financial instruments, trading strategies, and risks associated with potential investment opportunities.25 Such IKTs could be
used for their informational value (rather than their raw score) to help increase investors‘ awareness about what they should know, or at least investigate, prior to participating in a particular investment. A hedge fund, for
example, could have a stated level of preferred IKT score for a particular
investment opportunity. Investors below that level could participate, but
they and hedge fund managers would be on notice that they might not understand the risks of the investment opportunity. IKTs could facilitate better incorporation of risk into decision-making by clarifying the nature of
knowledge that might be desired for participation in particular investment
opportunities.
Better risk education is an important factor in enhancing risk management. Some of the lack of attention to risk that led to the credit crisis is a
consequence of incentive structures within the financial services industry.
However, better risk education might encourage retail investors, sophisticated market participants, and regulators to more closely question transactions and investment opportunities, such as the Madoff Ponzi scheme, that
seemingly offered a riskless premium return.26
3. Interactive Disclosure
In addition to regulatory penalty reform and greater focus on education, changes could also be made that promote greater disclosure surrounding financial markets, financial products, and risk. Regulated entity
disclosure requirements should be supplemented to require additional disclosure concerning dynamic risk. Required risk disclosure under Regula-

25

See U.S. GOV‘T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-08-200, HEDGE FUNDS: REGULATORS AND
MARKET PARTICIPANTS ARE TAKING STEPS TO STRENGTHEN MARKET DISCIPLINE, BUT CONTINUED
ATTENTION IS NEEDED 29 (2008), http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d08200.pdf (noting that ―[t]he ability
of market discipline to control hedge funds‘ risk is limited by some investors‘ inability to understand
and evaluate the information they receive . . . ‖) (link).
26
See Kara Scannell, SEC Had Chances for Years to Expose Madoff’s Alleged Ponzi Scheme,
WSJ.COM
Dec.
15,
2008,
http://online.WSJ.com/article/SB122928886040304911.html?mod=articleoutset-box (―The revelations
are the latest blow to the reputation of an agency that has been criticized for insufficient enforcement
and the failure to better monitor the dangerous risk-taking on Wall Street that triggered this year‘s financial crisis.‖) (link).
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tion S-K,27 which contains many of the specific disclosure requirements to
which reporting companies are subject, reflects a largely top-down perspective that focuses on aggregate risks to the reporting entity, which may not
adequately aggregate risks embedded in networks of connectivity that may
reach down to the level of individual traders.28 Mandatory disclosure about
risk should be supplemented to include more bottom-up perspectives, including discussion of company risk management policies and training, as
well as the specific ways in which all employee compensation, not just that
of senior executives, aligns with the potential risks that employees may undertake. Such disclosure is particularly important for all employees that directly engage in capital market trading activities.
C. Revolving Doors and Consequences for Failure
In the final analysis, the credit crisis should provide lessons about the
importance of appropriately addressing failure. Consumers have felt the
consequences of the credit crisis. They were encouraged to invest in housing by government policies on interest rates and home-buying incentive
programs.29 Creative industry packaging of mortgages, some of which were
―built to self-destruct,‖30 occurred alongside what some have characterized
as significant declines in loan documentation standards and increases in
subprime mortgage originations.31 Prior to the credit crisis, a wide range of
homeowners, not just subprime borrowers, engaged in risky behavior that
essentially took a directional bet on the continued increase of housing prices. Some borrowers had insufficient incentive to avoid high-risk mortgage
loans that they might not be able to pay.32 In the credit crisis aftermath,
27

Regulation
S-K,
17
C.F.R.
§ 229
(2009),
available
at
http://www.access.gpo.gov/nara/cfr/waisidx_09/17cfr229_09.html (link).
28
See
id.
at
§ 229.305,
available
at
http://edocket.access.gpo.gov/cfr_2009/aprqtr/pdf/17cfr229.305.pdf (―In preparing the foreign currency
value at risk disclosures, this registrant should report the aggregate potential loss from hypothetical
changes in both the DM/ FF exchange rate exposure and the FF/$US exchange rate exposure.‖) (link).
29
See Edmund L. Andrews, Greenspan Concedes Error on Regulation, NYTIMES.COM, Oct. 23,
2008, http://www.NYTimes.com/2008/10/24/business/economy/24panel.html (―Mr. Greenspan‘s critics
say that he encouraged the bubble in housing prices by keeping interest rates too low for too long and
that he failed to rein in the explosive growth of risky and often fraudulent mortgage lending.‖) (link); Jo
Becker, Sheryl Gay Stolberg & Stephen Labaton, White House Philosophy Stoked Mortgage Bonfire,
NYTIMES.COM, Dec. 20, 2008, http://www.NYTimes.com/2008/12/21/business/21admin.html (―‗This
administration made decisions that allowed the free market to operate as a barroom brawl instead of a
prize fight,‘ said L. William Seidman, who advised Republican presidents and led the savings and loan
bailout in the 1990s. ‗To make the market work well, you have to have a lot of rules.‘‖) (link).
30
Michael Lewis, The End, PORTFOLIO.COM, Nov. 11, 2008, http://www.portfolio.com/newsmarkets/national-news/portfolio/2008/11/11/The-End-of-Wall-Streets-Boom/ (link).
31
Id.
32
Martin Feldstein, How to Help People Whose Home Values Are Underwater, WSJ.COM., Nov.
18, 2008, http://online.WSJ.com/article/SB122697004441035727.html (link). Various government policies further encouraged consumer leveraging trends. The Bush administration initiated a program to
encourage home ownership that permitted home purchases with no money down. Tax policies, includ-
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consumers have been punished, in many instances far beyond the scope of
any risk-taking activities they might have undertaken.33 Although consumers in the U.S. do have the option of walking away from their mortgages,
doing so is financially costly and likely to negatively impact their credit.34
In contrast to failures by consumers, failures by industry participants
and regulators occur in an environment of revolving doors, where failure
may be rewarded with a better position.35 Revolving doors enable industry
participants to move from current failures to future prospects. For example,
being involved in the failure of a hedge fund has not limited future career
options in a number of high-profile cases.36 Although some firms such as
Lehman Brothers were permitted to fail, many financial services institutions
whose activities would otherwise have led to firm failure were saved by
government intervention.37 Even though the systemic failure rationales for
ing the deductibility of home mortgage interest payments and tax exemption for capital gains from home
sales adopted in 1997 during the Clinton administration, further encouraged consumers to purchase
homes. See Vikas Bajaj & David Leonhardt, Tax Break May Have Helped Cause Housing Bubble,
NYTIMES.COM, Dec. 18, 2008, http://www.NYTimes.com/2008/12/19/business/19tax.html (link). The
Federal Reserve under Alan Greenspan maintained low interest rates that many assert led to a housing
bubble. Id.; see also Joseph E. Stiglitz, Capitalist Fools, VANITY FAIR, Jan. 2009.
33
See Clyde Ashley & Krystal D. Wilson, The Credit Crunch and the Impact on the US Economy
and Global Markets: How Damaging Will It Be? 16 Proceedings OF AMER. SOC. BUSINESSES &
BEHAVIORAL SCIS. 35 (2009), http://www.asbbs.org/files/2009/PDF/A/AshleyC2.pdf (describing negative impact of credit crisis on consumers, including increasing mortgage defaults and foreclosures,
which has put downward pressure on housing prices and decreasing levels of available credit) (link);
Simon Johnson, Can the Federal Reserve Protect Consumers?, N.Y. TIMES ECONOMIX BLOG, Aug. 13,
2009,
http://economix.blogs.NYTIMES.COM/2009/08/13/can-the-federal-reserve-protect-consumers/
(―More broadly, the former Fed chairman Alan Greenspan famously stood by despite being warned by
his colleagues about the housing bubble and the associated abuses of consumers. As the housing frenzy
developed in 2003 and low-income people got sucked in and—many of them—suckered, Mr. Bernanke
argued for a further lowering of interest rates on the basis of short-run macroeconomic considerations;
apparently he was oblivious to the dangers that implied to consumer-as-borrowers.‖) (link).
34
Nick Timiraos, Some Buy a New Home to Bail on the Old, WSJ.COM., June 11, 2008,
http://online.WSJ.com/article/SB121314811278463077.html (―To be sure, walking away from a mortgage, even if legal, has plenty of drawbacks: Borrowers lose the ability to take out unsecured loans,
since foreclosures can stay on a credit report for seven years. In some states, lenders can sue for assets,
including a new house.‖) (link).
35
Michael Lewis & David Einhorn, The End of the Financial World as We Know It, NYTimes.
com, Jan. 3, 2009, http://www.NYTimes.com/2009/01/04/opinion/04lewiseinhorn.html (describing the
SEC as ―plagued by wacky incentives‖ based on prospect of future employment on Wall Street) (link).
36
See Frank Partnoy, INFECTIOUS GREED: HOW DECEIT AND RISK CORRUPTED THE FINANCIAL
MARKETS 182183 (2003) (noting that Kidder Peabody trader Joseph Jett, whose trades generated $350
million in losses for Kidder Peabody, was acquitted of securities fraud, avoided damages from civil lawsuits and revived his career, becoming chief investment officer of a multi-million dollar offshore investment fund) (link); James M. Clash, Robert Lenzner & Michael Maiello with Josephine Lee, The
$500
Billion
Hedge
Fund
Folly,
FORBES.COM,
Aug.
6,
2001,
http://www.forbes.com/2001/08/06/070.html (noting that Michael Berger, Joseph Jett and John Meriwether of Long-Term Capital all found opportunities after their initial hedge funds failed) (link).
37
OFFICE OF THE SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR THE TROUBLED ASSET RELIEF PROGRAM,
QUARTERLY
REPORT
TO
CONGRESS
3348
(2010),
available
at
http://www.sigtarp.gov/reports/congress/2010/April2010_Quarterly_Report_to_Congress.pdf
(giving
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such rescues may be cogent and reasoned, preventing firms from failing
poses a significant problem for the future. Institutions that cannot fail are
likely to continue to take outsized risks that generate significant private
profits on the upside and large public losses on the downside. Failures by
individual industry participants and firms may thus not be sufficiently penalized.
Although industry failures have and should be highlighted, greater attention also needs to be paid to government failures. Prevention of future
crises will greatly depend on the extent to which both government and industry participants can be held accountable for failure.38 Although greater
industry expertise and additional resources are needed at the SEC,39 the revolving door between the SEC and Wall Street may have contributed to
SEC regulatory failures.40 Similarly, SEC staff supervision of the Madoff
investigation may have been more concerned about damaging future career
prospects than giving teeth to the SEC investigation.41 Concerns about future career opportunities may also have been a factor in the SEC failure to
pursue action against Ponzi operator Allen Stanford. The head of Enforcement in the SEC‘s Forth Worth, Texas office did not undertake an enforcement action against Stanford—despite repeated examinations by SEC staff
overview of TARP programs and status of firms receiving TARP funds as of March 31. 2010) (link); see
also BAIRD WEBEL, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R 40438, ONGOING GOVERNMENT ASSISTANCE FOR
AMERICAN
INTERNATIONAL
GROUP
(AIG)
2
(2009),
available
at
http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R40438.pdf (describing the ―essential failure‖ of AIG) (link); OFFICE
OF THE SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR THE TROUBLED ASSET RELIEF PROGRAM, INITIAL REPORT TO
THE
CONGRESS
4190
(2009),
available
at
http://www.sigtarp.gov/reports/congress/2009/SIGTARP_Initial_Report_to_the_Congress.pdf (listing
recipients of bailout funds, which include financial services firms such as J.P. Morgan, Citigroup,
Goldman Sachs, Morgan Stanley, and Bank of America, as well as AIG, General Motors, and Chrysler)
(link); Bryan Burrough, Bringing Down Bear Stearns, VANITYFAIR.COM, Aug. 2008,
http://www.vanityfair.com/politics/features/2008/08/bear_stearns200808 (describing the near failure of
Bear Stearns) (link).
38
Congress, for example, bears few consequences for legislation that produces failed and fragmented regulatory frameworks. Ironically, fear of failure at the SEC may have been a factor in the failure to pursue the Madoff investigation, while the desire to avoid a case that was not bullet-proof and
bring a larger quantity of cases may have been a factor in the failure to pursue an enforcement action
against the Stanford Ponzi Scheme. See Donald C. Langevoort, The SEC and the Madoff Scandal:
Three Narratives in Search of a Story (Georgetown Law Faculty Working Paper No. 116, 2009), available at http://scholarship.law.georgetown.edu/fwps_papers/116/ (describing how sensitivity to failure influences SEC investigations) (link).
39
See id. at 46; Suzanne McGee, Revolving Credit, PORTFOLIO.COM, Dec. 3, 2009,
http://www.portfolio.com/industry-news/banking-finance/2009/12/03/revolving-door-between-wallstreet-and-government-must-be-reformed/ (link).
40
See Tom McGinty, SEC Lawyer One Day, Opponent the Next, WSJ.COM, Apr. 5, 2010,
http://online.WSJ.com/article/SB10001424052702303450704575160043010579272.html (link); Pam
Martens, Madoff and the SEC’s Revolving Door, Counterpunch.org, Aug. 31, 2009,
http://www.counterpunch.org/martens08312009.html (link).
41
Lewis & Einhorn, supra note 35 (―If you work for the enforcement division of the S.E.C. you
probably know in the back of your mind, and in the front too, that if you maintain good relations with
Wall Street you might soon be paid huge sums of money to be employed by it.‖).
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that strongly suggested that Stanford was running a Ponzi scheme, later
sought to represent Stanford, and for a short period actually did so.42 One
recent empirical study suggests that biases in enforcement may reflect systematic SEC under-enforcement against large firms.43 This may be the
product of regulatory capture, a potential risk with any regulatory framework. Regulatory principles that emphasize transparency may be one approach for dealing with regulatory capture. In 2007, the Senate Committees
on Finance and the Judiciary conducted a joint investigation of the SEC
over ―allegations of lax enforcement, improper political influence, [and]
whistleblower retaliation.‖44 This investigation was a response to negative
publicity following the SEC termination of an employee involved in a
hedge fund investigation, in which assertions were made about improper
political influence in SEC enforcement investigations.45 The joint congressional investigation also drew attention to the revolving door between the
SEC and Wall Street that some assert improperly influences SEC investigations.46
Steps should be taken to prevent and reduce the extent to which revolving doors may intensify the likelihood of government or industry failure. A
number of options might be available,47 including strict enforcement of
42

SEC, OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL, REPORT NO. OIG-526, INVESTIGATION OF THE SEC‘S
RESPONSE TO CONCERNS REGARDING ROBERT ALLEN STANFORD‘S ALLEGED PONZI SCHEME 17,
2728, 131148 (2010), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/studies/2010/oig-526.pdf (link).
43
See The Firing of an SEC Attorney and the Investigation of Pequot Capital Management: Hearing Before the S. Finance and Judiciary Comms., 110th Cong. 37 (2007), available at
http://permanent.access.gpo.gov/lps86499/Leg_110_080307_SEC[1].pdf [hereinafter Pequot Report]
(―Evidence we reviewed suggests that the reluctance to question Mack represents a much more subtle
and pervasive problem than an individual partisan political favor. SEC officials were overly deferential
to Mack—not because of his politics—but because he was an ‗industry captain‘ who could hire influential counsel to represent him.‖) (link).
See also Joe Nocera, Chasing Small Fry, S.E.C. Let Madoff Get Away, NYTIMES.COM, June 27,
2009, http://www.NYTimes.com/2009/06/27/business/27nocera.html?pagewanted=1 (link); Stavros Gadinis, The SEC and the Financial Industry: Evidence from Enforcement Against Broker-Dealers 8 (Harvard
Law
and
Economics
Discussion
Paper
No.
27,
2009),
available
at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1333717 (―Instead, any bias towards big firms is
systematic, and thus consistent both with complaints about the agency‘s limited resources and with concerns about the impact of the ‗revolving doors‘ between the SEC and the industry.‖) (link).
44
Pequot Report, supra note 43, at 1.
45
Id. at 7.
46
Id. at 82–87 (discussing post-SEC employment of an Associate Director in the SEC Enforcement
Decision, who joined the law firm that had contacted the SEC concerning questions relating to a firm
client‘s role in a transaction being investigated by the SEC, and focusing on whether this employee recused himself from the investigation in a timely manner after he began pursuing employment with the
same law firm).
47
Existing conduct and conflict of interest rules already address questions relating to revolving
doors. For example, SEC Regulation Concerning Conduct of Members and Employees and Former
Members and Employees of the Commission Rule 8 ―prohibits a former Commission employee from
appearing before the Commission in a representative capacity in a particular matter in which he or she
participated personally and substantially while an employee of the Commission.‖ SEC, supra note, 42 at
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bans, mandatory time lags on future employment, or clear firewalls or recusal policies with respect to prior employment.48 Congressman Barney
Frank‘s response to a staffer who went to work for a financial services industry lobbyist may be an approach to consider.49 When a top staffer of the
House Financial Services Committee went to work as a lobbyist for the
owner of the largest credit default swap houses, Congressman Frank banned
committee staff from talking to the former staffer about financial regulation
or financial matters until Frank no longer chairs the Committee.50 In the
end, such steps may be one important way to address the widespread industry and regulator shortcomings that led to the credit crisis.
II. CONCLUSION
The credit crisis is a watershed event that illustrates much about both
the importance and limits of regulation. It demonstrates, for example, how
national regulatory frameworks may be ineffective in increasingly globalized financial markets. The credit crisis underscores the need for regulatory reform that creates frameworks that fit the contexts of their application.
Regulation also needs to address the persistent problem of failure and how
to ensure that existing incentives do not reward failure by either regulators
or industry participants. Regulation is also increasingly a factor in global
competitiveness, as well as a mechanism that can instill confidence in financial market integrity. Confidence is a huge factor in the financial services industry.51 In addition to causing significant market volatility and
instability, market crises may deleteriously impact market confidence. In
an industry where physical assets are few and intangible assets are paramount, a failure in confidence may also cause financial markets to freeze.
A crisis of confidence can be difficult to overcome.
Market crises often test confidence and may even trigger regulatory
reactions that toughen the application of existing legal frameworks or lead
to the adoption of new ones in response to a particular market crisis. The
current market crisis unfolded in arenas with significant existing regulation.
Existing reform legislation fails to take sufficient account of the implications of regulatory failures that contributed to the credit crisis. On May 20,
2010, the U.S. Senate passed the financial reform bill sponsored by Senator
Chris Dodd.52 Although this new legislation purports to address the under10 (citing 17 C.F.R. § 200.735-8 (a)(1) (2010)).
48
Pequot Report, supra note 43, at 7–8.
49
Posting of Paul Blumenthal to Sunlight Foundation Blog, Revolving Door Staffer Rebuked, Permanently Banned From Talking to Committee Staff
(Apr. 1, 2010,
15:11),
http://blog.sunlightfoundation.com/2010/04/01/revolving-door-staffer-rebuked-permanently-bannedfrom-talking-to-committee-staff/ (link).
50
Id.
51
James Surowiecki, Public Humiliation, THENEWYORKER.COM, Sept. 29, 2008,
http://www.newyorker.com/talk/financial/2008/09/29/080929ta_talk_surowiecki (link).
52
Restoring American Financial Stability Act of 2010, S. 3217, 111th Cong. (2010), available at
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lying problems that led to the credit crisis, as has been the case historically
in the United States, it targets the causes of the last crisis rather than achieving overarching reform of vulnerabilities and other problems in financial
market regulatory frameworks more generally.53 More fundamental regulatory reforms are needed to address potential future market crises. Reactions
to the current crisis should thus be initiated at the same time as an overall
assessment of existing regulation prior to the adoption of any new regulatory requirements. Existing regulatory frameworks should be evaluated and
new regulations adopted taking into account specific regulatory principles.
Further, regulatory reforms in response to the current crisis should be
shaped by acknowledgment of a fundamental shift in the nature of trading
activities and financial market networks. Changing technology has shaped
trading activities in a broad range of entities, both regulated and unregulated. The incentives that govern traders and other market participants in
such trading contexts should be key considerations in proposed regulatory
reforms. Such incentives can play a significant role in determining the extent to which financial market networks embody speculative risk-taking
trading activities or reflect more cautious approaches to risk that truly incorporate private market discipline and minimize the potential for systemic
market instability, network failure, and industry and government failure.

http://banking.senate.gov/public/_files/ChairmansMark31510AYO10306_xmlFinancialReformLegislati
onBill.pdf (implementing greater regulation of derivatives, establishing new consumer protections for
financial products, and creating a liquidation process for winding down failing systemically risky financial institutions to avoid bailouts) (link).
53
David M. Herszenhorn, Bill Passed in Senate Broadly Expands Oversight of Wall Street,
NYTIMES.COM, May 20, 2010, http://www.NYTimes.com/2010/05/21/business/21regulate.html (discussing the Senate bill, noting that some experts characterize the bill as targeting past problems and thus
leaving the financial system vulnerable to a future collapse) (link).
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